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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

NOTES
UNCOMFORTABLE MURDERS

By
WALTER

H. HITCHLER*

The phrase "malice aforethought" when first used to describe the distinguishing feature of murder probably was used in its literal sense, i.e., a culpable
intent to kill formed prior to the death dealing blow.'
The forensic experience of successive generations disclosed many cases
of homicide which, though not resulting from a desire to kill, were considered
heinous enough to deserve the full penalties of murder. These, accordingly,
one after another were brought within the definition of murder by a wide
judicial construction of the phrase malice aforethought.
The various classes of homicides which were held to be with "malice aforethought" and therefore murder were summarized and classified as follows:
"In reference to murder, 'malice' (the word 'afon-thought' is practically
unmeaning), means any one of the following states of mind, preceding or coexisting with the act or omission by which death is caused:
(a) An intention to cause the death of, or grievous bodily harm to, any
person, whether such person is actually killed or not.
(b) Knowledge that the act which causes death will probably cause the
death of, or grievous bodily harm to, some person, whether such person is the
person actually killed or not, although such knowledge is accompanied by indifference whether death or grievous bodily harm is caused or not, or by a wish
that it may not be caused.
(c) An intent to commit any felony whatever.
(d) An intent to oppose by force any officer of justice on his way to, in, or
returning from the execution of the duty of arresting, keeping in custody, ot
imprisoning any person whom he is lawfully entitled to arrest, keep in custody,
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or imprison, or the duty of keeping the peace, or dispersing an unlawful assembly, provided that the offender has notice that the person killed is such an
officer so tmployed.2
Concerning the first class of murder the Pennsylvania court has recently
stated:$ "If the intent be directly to produce bodily injury, it must be such an
injury as may be expected to involve serious consequences, either periling life
or leading to great bodily harm." The court refused to detail what constitutes
great bodily harm saying: "We agree, however, that it is not necessary that thr
injury be intended to be permanent or dangerous to life; it is malicious to
intend injury such as to seriously interfere with health and comfort."
Does this mean that a killing which results from an unlawful act intended
to make another seriously uncomfortable is murder? The word comfort is connected with health by the conjunction and, and it may, therefore, be argued that
the act must be intended to interfere with both health and comfort. An act
intended to interfere seriously with health would probably be an act imperiling
life or leading to great bodily harm.
2

See Turner v. Com., 167 Ky. 305, 180 S.W. 768.

8 Com. v. Dorazio, 365 Pa. 291, 74 A.2d 125 (1950).

